While the objectives of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan differed significantly, their shortcomings had much in common. Whereas the war with Iraq was justified by reference to evidence of a somewhat indeterminate WMD threat, the case for war in Afghanistan was based on the clear and uncontroversial fact that the Taliban regime was providing safe haven for Al Qaeda. But as in Iraq, American troops have been forced to take unnecessary risks to avoid Afghan civilian casualties. As in Iraq, an insurgency against American troops has continued unabated, despite the fall of an oppressive regime. But since the presence of Islamic militants in Afghanistan was the justification for American intervention in the first place, their continued existence makes American success in Afghanistan even more elusive.
From the beginning, the United States chose to fight a proxy war in Afghanistan, by exploiting the assistance of the Northern Alliance, rather than taking direct military control of Afghan territory. The inevitable result of this policy has been continued control of the vast majority of the country by a hodge-podge of warlords. This has meant that the pro-American Karzai government controls little beyond the region of Kabul. It has meant that warlords have been free to oppose the central government, fight among themselves, and permit the presence of terrorist groups often under the influence of foreign powers. Examples of this last include the resistance of the Iranian-linked forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in western Afghanistan,[6] and the continued infiltration of Taliban forces into southern Afghanistan from Pakistan.[7]
And yet even in the areas under the control of the United States and its allies, the Afghan security situation is still out of control. Terrorist attacks have been directed not only against occupying troops, but also against Afghan civilians and police forces.[8] In the meantime the Afghan government places its focus, not on eliminating these fighters or the warlords who encourage them, but on pleading for more money for economic reconstruction.[9] Even more ominous has been the negligence of the Karzai regime in failing to prevent the reintroduction of Islamic law, most prominently by permitting a onetime prohibition of cable television on the grounds of its “un-Islamic” content.[10]
In Afghanistan, deference to “humanitarian” as well as religious sensibilities distracts the United States from the main objectives of the war. This war began as a “humanitarian” effort, with the paradoxical image of American forces simultaneously dropping bombs and relief packets over Afghan territory. In truth the United States has no obligation to “reconstruct” the Afghan economy, particularly when little economy existed before the war that could have been destroyed in the first place. (Just like in Iraq, as long as anarchy rules, little prospect for economic reconstruction (private or public) will exist, anyway.) And as in Iraq, if there is to be any chance of restoring the country to law and order–and preventing it from becoming a haven for anti-American terrorists once again–Afghanistan will need a strong central government charged with the function of protecting the individual rights of its citizens. But this function is neglected by a government beholden to unjustifiable and distracting religious and economic functions.
The only purpose of the American presence in Afghanistan consonant with the moral obligations of the United States government to its citizens is to prevent the repeated use of Afghanistan as a terrorist training grounds. The present course of American policy in Afghanistan is doing little to achieve this purpose. Unless the United States can succeed in refocusing its Afghanistan policy, by taking steps to extend the power of the Afghan central government and eliminate the power of rival warlords, our presence there will become pointless. In that case, American efforts will be better focused elsewhere, against targets posing a more immediate threat to American interests. These targets are the subject of our next category of grading.
References:
[6] “U.S., allied forces battle Afghan rebels.” Associated Press report. January 29, 2003 < http://charleston.net/stories/012903/ter_29afghan.shtml>.
[7] “Taliban renewal fed from Pakistan.” Washington Times. July 22, 2003
[8] “Gunbattle at Afghanistan police headquarters kills 22.” Associated press report. August 18, 2003. < http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001543000_afghan18.html>.
[9] “Afghan leader flies in to ask for more aid.” The Guardian. June 5, 2003
[10] “Afghanistan: ban on cable TV seen as symptom of power struggle.” Radio Free Europe report. January 29, 2003
Related Articles in Series:
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 1 of 12): A Report Card
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 2 of 12): Iraq
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 3 of 12): Afghanistan
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 4 of 13) The Cold War Against “The Axis of Evil”
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 5 of 12): North Korea
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 6 of 12): The Breeding Grounds
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 7 of 12): Saudi Arabia
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 8 of 12): Pakistan
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 9 of 12): Israel and the Palestinians
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 10 of 12): Military Deployment and Readiness
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 11 of 12): International Law and Diplomacy
- America’s Failing War Effort (Part 12 of 12): Conclusion
